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51. Introduction
Since the launching of the first service using 
radio spectrum in the late 19th century, wireless 
telegraphy, we have witnessed the emergence of innumerable new services competing for the access to a portion of the limited radio spectrum resources. Examples of services 
using the spectrum are radio, television, 
voice and video telephony, internet, national 
security and defense, whether forecasting, 
emergency assistance, guidance for navigation 
of all kinds of means of transport by air, ground 
and sea, the exploration of the cosmos and 
many others. Digital services, many of which 
use the spectrum, have an increasing impact 
in the economy. For example, they reduce information and coordination costs in the 
whole economy - activities became cheaper, 
faster and more convenient-, ease transactions 
and increase productivity, World Bank (2016).The allocation of spectrum to services has been planned by governmental agencies practically since the early days of radio communications. Governmental planning has 
been the response to the complex definition 
of property rights, high enforcement and transaction costs linked to the existence 
of harmful electromagnetic interferences, 
services that are pure public goods, 
externalities associated to services, and economies of scale when spectrum allocation 
is harmonized. 
In the last decades, improved technology enabling services to share the same portion 
of spectrum, a better understanding of interference solving and of spectrum markets and especially the extraordinary growth in the 
demand for spectrum, have put deep pressure 
to traditional allocation methods. As a result, the reform of spectrum has become a salient policy issue and multiple new approaches to spectrum management have emerged. Examples of spectrum management reforms 
are the use of auctions to grant licenses, 
the authorization of secondary market 
transactions -transfer, leasing, mutualisation of 
usage rights- , the use of administered incentive 
pricing, spectrum sharing techniques and the 
definition of licenses in terms of acceptable interference parameters.
Some remarkably anticipated very early, 
the need for more efficient approaches to 
spectrum management, Coase (1959, 1960), 
Levin (1970). Many more followed these 
claims supporting the exchange of usage rights in the market and market participation for a 
better allocation of radio spectrum, Hazlett 
(1998, 2003), Kwerel and Williams (2002), 
Baumol and Robyn (2006). Others proposed collective use of spectrum as an alternative 
solution to scarcity, Noam (1998), Benkler 
(2002), Werbach (2004). More recently, a number of authors pointed out the importance 
of incorporating the definition of acceptable interference in spectrum licenses to reduce 
transaction costs, Webb (2009), ITU (2009), 
Kwerel and Williams (2010) and Cave and Web 
(2012). Spectrum management reform should not 
be regarded solely as a conflict where we only have two options; either choosing governmental 
planning or market liberalization. An 
important component of inefficiency may account for the spectrum allocation process 
but yet a significant source stems from the intrinsic nature of radio-spectrum. Spectrum physical features together with the attributes of services provided using the spectrum produce market failure. The response should be a combination of a sound regulatory 
framework, the internalization of technological progress in regulation to overcome market 
failure, and market participation in spectrum 
management in order to increase efficiency of spectrum allocation.
Electromagnetic interference, a feature of 
spectrum usage, is a negative externality that 
makes the definition of property rights difficult, the respect for these rights hard to enforce and the cost of inter-service and also intra-service spectrum transactions uncertain. Not only 
the costs but also the benefits of a spectrum 
management reform are uncertain due to, 
inter alia, of the existence of hard to measure 
external value linked to services.  García and 
Valiño (2013), Bazelon and McHenery (2013), 
Alden (2012), Prasad (2014) and Cave et al 
(2016) contributed to define methodologies for estimating the value of spectrum and the 
externalities linked to services. A more general framework to take account of externalities but yet highly applicable to the topic can be found 
in Cornes and Sandler (1996).The unsolved question in spectrum management is no longer if a reform enabling higher market participation is necessary or not but the path and speed of reform with current 
and expected technology evolution, and market and regulatory structure. This paper aims to contribute to answer this question by offering 
6a model to ascertain the optimal speed of 
spectrum management reform.  We first study uncertainty sources to unravel causes and the potential policy responses since uncertainty of 
benefits and costs of reform is a key element of the porblem. We continue developing the analogy between the case of spectrum reform and the reform of economies in transition 
commenced by Minervini (2014). We depart 
from the model in Dewatripont and Roland 
(1995) adding the idiosyncrasies of spectrum 
management, namely the fast evolution of 
digital technologies using the spectrum, and the existence of market failure in the provision of wireless services. We also gained inside from the literature on investment under uncertain 
benefits e.g. Dixit (1992), Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994), and the literature about uncertain 
costs of reform, Pindyck (1993).This paper is structured as follows section 
2 analyzes the different types of reform and 
the available policy options, section 3 presents 
sources of uncertainty, section 4 offers a discussion on the optimal path and sequencing of spectrum management reform and section 5 concludes.
2. Types of spectrum management 
reform
We define a spectrum management reform as the regulatory change intended to enable 
increased efficiency of spectrum usage so 
that total welfare is maximized. Reforms can 
be categorized by the type of efficiency gain 
that they are intended to produce. Productive 
efficiency ensure that a service is provided 
with no more than the spectrum required, 
allocative efficiency that the assortment 
of services using the spectrum maximizes 
social welfare and dynamic efficiency that the compound of services can be changed when a new higher social welfare allocation emerges.Reforms take account of regulatory 
and technology innovation. An innovative regulatory change may consist of a new 
approach for defining property rights that reduces inter service transaction costs and/or the costs to enforce respect to spectrum 
usage rights, innovative ways to enable intra 
service transactions or the internalization of technology advance into spectrum usage rights. 
Specific policy recommendations exemplifying spectrum management reform types can be 
found in García-Zaballos and Foditsch (2015).
We define two types of technological 
progress of spectrum usage.  A technology advancement improving the delivery of services happens when a new technology allows either using less amount of spectrum 
to provide a service, or it improves service features and capacity or both at the same 
time. For example, the second generation of mobile telephony allowed peak speed data 
rates of 9.6 kbps whereas fourth generation, 
the so called LTE, allows peak data rates of 1 
Gbit/s. Another example is the migration from 
analogue to digital television. Digital television technologies can provide a minimum of four times more television channels than analogue 
using the same amount of spectrum. However, 
new technology such as this, does not improve the allocation of spectrum to services.
A technology advancement improving the allocation of spectrum arises when a new technology enables for a better allocation of 
spectrum. Better allocations may be obtained from reducing inter service and intra service 
transaction costs, from allowing the usage of the same portion of spectrum by several services or from reducing the costs to enforce respect to spectrum usage rights. Carrying out spectrum inventories that identify spectrum 
supply and demand may help to figure out the expected return of a reform.  Next section 
identifies the different types of spectrum management reform and some policy options to implement them.
2.1 Reforms achieving greater productive 
efficiency 
Productive efficiency of a given allocation of spectrum to services is achieved when 
a firm delivering a service cannot employ an additional unit of spectrum to increase production without reducing the production of 
another firm delivering the same service. When this condition is met the service is delivered at 
the lowest average total cost, and it uses the minimum possible amount of spectrum. In 
other words, the use of a portion of spectrum 
is productively efficient if service delivery is 
at the production possibility frontier. Figure 
2.1 shows two firms A and B using a certain amount of spectrum to provide the same 
service. Points A, B are productively efficient, 
point C is inefficient and point D is not possible 
7with current technology. The figure also depicts the effect of applying a new technology to the 
production of a service. A new technology 
improving productive efficiency would move right the productive possibility frontier curve.
Auctions of spectrum rights of use and 
the authorization of secondary market transactions are spectrum reforms intended to grant spectrum rights to those that value the spectrum the most and can deliver services using the minimum possible amount 
of spectrum. In figure 2.1, point C is not 
productively efficient. Auctions and secondary market transactions may move C closer to the production possibility frontier.One way of achieving higher productive 
efficiency of a new allocation of spectrum is to auction the rights of use. If licenses have 
already been granted, the authorization of secondary market transactions may help to improve the initial distribution of spectrum 
to firms. Examples of secondary market transactions are the possibility to transfer or leasing the spectrum rights of use to a different user providing the same service or the mutualisation of spectrum rights. 
Mutualisation consists of sharing all or part of 
the spectrum license among two or more firms providing the same service in the same or in different spectrum bands. 
As we can see in figure 2.1, the production possibility frontier curve shifts right if a new technology enables to use less spectrum or 
it improves service features. In this case, 
productive efficiency gains can be achieved immediately if spectrum licenses allow spectrum users to change technology without 
prior administrative authorization. For 
efficiency gains to be obtained technology change must not cause harmful interference to spectrum users in the same or adjacent 
bands. An example of an authorization of technology change is the so called spectrum 
re-farming authorizing the migration of spectrum use to more advanced generation of mobile technologies. If technology change is 
not allowed and there is technological change, 
points A and B in figure 2.1 that before the new 
technology were efficient would be situated below the new production possibility frontier. 
2.2 Reforms achieving greater allocative 
efficiency 
Allocative efficiency is achieved when the distribution of services into spectrum portions 
is optimal so that social welfare is maximized. Optimality includes not only the private value 
of spectrum, - the willingness to pay of the 
firm using the spectrum -, but also its social value -externalities linked to the delivery of 
services-. Allocative efficiency is achieved 
when the marginal benefit of spectrum use equals the marginal cost of service delivery for all applications using the spectrum.
Achievement of productive efficiency does not preclude the attainment of allocative 
efficiency. Let’s consider a service A using the spectrum with lower value for society than 
service B. Service A enjoys the allocation of 
a higher amount of spectrum than B. The 
introduction of a productively efficient reform 
in both, A and B, may increase total welfare less than changing the allocation of spectrum in order to grant more spectrum to the service 
A with higher social value. Table 2.1 shows a spectrum reform increasing productive 
efficiency in A and B. Table 2.2 represents a reform changing the allocation of spectrum to 
increase social welfare. As it can be observed 
total welfare is higher in reform 2 than in 
reform 1. It is important to note that for the 
calculations in table 2.2 we have considered diminishing returns to the amount of spectrum allocated to a service. This is because social value per unit of spectrum allocated to a service decreases when the amount of spectrum allocated to this service increases.
Figure 2.7 Production possibility frontier of 
spectrum use with technology advancement
8order to reduce the uncertainty of the process. Incentive auctions enable the change of use of 
spectrum, thus increasing not only allocative 
efficiency but also productive efficiency. The allocation change is valued by the market 
instead of administratively determined, so 
reducing the possibility to cross-subsidize one 
of the services involved in the transaction. An example of an incentive auction design can be 
found in FCC (2012).The term spectrum sharing encompasses a set of different spectrum management concepts. It may refer to the collective use of 
spectrum, the dynamic spectrum management, or the underlay spectrum management. 
Definitions can be found in RSPG (2011). The collective use of spectrum is the use of spectrum without license under a set of well-
defined set of technical conditions. Spectrum user can access the spectrum provided that they use devices in compliance with the 
conditions previously defined. Collective use 
does not increase allocative efficiency since it can be used neither to migrate to a more 
efficient allocation of spectrum nor to allow the delivery of several services in the same portion of spectrum. Collective use is a way 
of delivering services that doesn’t require the grant of rights of use. It is normally employed for allocating spectrum to short-range devices 
such as Wi-Fi or RFID applications. Spectrum underlay also known as spread spectrum technologies consist of the emission of very low spectral power density signals that can coexist with other spectrum uses in 
Examples of reforms increasing allocative 
efficiency are the use of administered 
incentive pricing, incentive auctions and 
spectrum sharing licenses. Administered incentive pricing1 (AIP) consists of charging a fee for the use of spectrum which is related to the opportunity cost of using this portion 
of spectrum, Smith-Nera (1996) and Cave, 
Doyle and Webb (2007). Different portions 
have distinct values, so using AIP requires calculating the opportunity cost of using each 
frequency band. The purpose of AIP is making license owners to return the spectrum if they 
are using a band inefficiently. The fee should take account of the costs borne by another services not using the band. Costs may come from using the service with means different 
to spectrum, or with a less valuable spectrum 
band. AIP can be a good measure to increase 
allocative efficiency when it is possible to 
calculate spectrum value, both private and 
social. However, a state agency may lack the 
monetary measure of costs and profits of spectrum use because it does not have all the relevant information regarding consumer 
preferences and spectrum users’ willingness to pay.Incentive auctions2 consists of two 
related auctions, a forward auction where it is 
determined a firm’s willingness to pay to access the spectrum and a reverse auction which 
establish the price for which the firm using 
the spectrum is willing to sell it. Prior to the 
auction, it is necessary to design a frequency 
repacking process analyzing the potential transaction costs of spectrum reallocation in 
Table 2.1: Productive efficiency reform
Service Units of spectrum 
allocated
Social value per 
unit of spectrum
Productive 
efficiency
(Before reform)
Productive 
efficiency
(After reform)
Total Welfare
A 10 1 75% 90% 9
B 2 5 75% 90% 9
A+B 12 1.664 (Avg) 75% (Avg) 90% (Avg) 18
Source: Authors
Table 2.2: Change of allocation reform
Service Units of spectrum 
allocated
Social value per unit 
of spectrum
Productive 
efficiency
Total Welfare
A 6 2 75% 9
B 6 4 75% 18
A+B 12 3 (Avg) 75% (Avg) 27
Source: Authors
9also in future changes of allocation. The line delimitating whether a reform increases 
only allocative or also dynamic efficiency is 
sometimes blurred. For example, the design and processes of an incentive auction may be re-used in the future if the service demanding to access the spectrum share technical features with the services for which the incentive 
auction was designed, but in other situations the incentive auction should be redesigned.
Examples of reforms dynamically efficient are those enabling future changes of spectrum 
allocations. Two examples are the authorization 
of spectrum underlay technologies, and the 
definition of licenses in terms of acceptable interference. Spectrum underlay technologies are able to use the spectrum that is already in use by other service without interfering with 
the incumbent user. Future changes of the underlay spectrum use are possible.
The definition of spectrum licenses in 
terms of the maximum acceptable interference, 
that devices are willing to accept, facilitates 
inter-service spectrum transactions, thus the dynamic allocation of spectrum without 
administrative intervention. Let’s define an interference limit that the devices using 
the same frequency, with the effect of slightly 
increasing the noise floor -electromagnetic interference- to incumbent spectrum users. Spectrum underlay is a way to increase 
allocative efficiency in spectrum management since it allows the use of the same portion of spectrum by different services and it also enables future changes of use.
Dynamic spectrum management includes 
both, regulatory instruments and technical approaches. It is intended to allow using a portion of spectrum by an entrant and an incumbent spectrum user taking advantage of the fact that the incumbent is not using a frequency in a particular geographical area or time slot. Examples of technical 
approaches are cognitive radio, sensing of 
frequencies being used, geo-location beacons 
or databases of spectrum usage. A regulatory instrument enabling dynamic use of spectrum 
is the definition of shared access licenses. Such licenses delimit usage conditions of a particular portion of spectrum being used by 
an incumbent for a defined time period or area. 
Table 2.3 shows total welfare after introducing both a new allocation and a spectrum sharing reform. 
Table 2.3: Spectrum sharing reform
Service Units of spectrum 
allocated
Social value per unit 
of spectrum
Productive 
efficiency
Total Welfare
A 6 2 75% 9
B 6 4 75% 18
C 2 2 75% 3
A+B+C 12 3 (Avg) 75% (Avg) 30
Source: Authors
2.3 Reforms achieving greater dynamic 
efficiency 
Dynamic efficiency is achieved when it is possible to change the allocation of spectrum in response to either the emergence of new services with high social value or when there is a change in the value generated by services 
that turns inefficient current allocation. For 
example, the increasing number of applications offered through mobile broadband increase the social value of this service over time.Spectrum reforms intended to increase 
dynamic efficiency also increment allocative 
efficiency. The significant difference between 
reforms increasing allocative efficiency and reforms enhancing both is that the latter can be used not only in a particular case but 
a frequency band are willing to accept, for 
example -110 dBm per MHz3.  Transaction costs of a change of spectrum allocation would be greatly reduced if an entrant service is able to comply with this limit and it is willing to pay for the access to the portion of the spectrum for which limits of acceptable interference has 
been defined. The lowered transaction costs stems from the reduced risk of interference. Even if a frequency repackaging process 
is necessary in the reallocation process, uncertainty and transaction cost will have 
been greatly reduced. An increasing number of authors have claimed for the importance 
of incorporating the definition of acceptable 
interference in spectrum licenses, Webb 
(2009), Kwerel and Williams (2010) and Cave 
and Web (2012).
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2.4 Mixed reformsSpectrum reforms rarely have economic sense implemented individually. Reforms usually come in packages that need to be 
carried out sequentially. Table 2.4 shows total 
welfare of a productively efficient reform followed by a reform improving allocative 
efficiency. The initia allocation is described in 
table 2.1.   Normally it is not possible to make a choice 
on the order of spectrum reforms. However, it is possible to choose the starting time and 
speed of the first and subsequent changes. To exemplify how a mixed reform is carried 
out, let’s consider technology advancement allowing the provision of a service using less amount of spectrum. The result of reform implementation is a new portion of available spectrum that can be used either to increase the amount produced of the existing service or to allocate a new service with expected higher social value. If the latter option is carried out then a second reform is required to accommodate the entrant service to the available spectrum. 
A real example of such situation is the transition from analogue to digital television 
in the UHF band, the so called digital dividend. Transition resulted in the availability of new 
frequencies in a band highly demanded. After the transition part of the frequencies of the digital dividend were allocated to mobile broadband. The new allocation required a series of complex technical studies in order to reduce interference problems between mobile broadband and digital television services.
3. Uncertainty associated to spectrum 
management reform
Spectrum management reforms intended 
to increase productive efficiency are usually 
less prone to uncertain results. Consequently, 
once regulatory mechanisms are created, transactions can be carried out by market agents 
provided that there is sufficient supervision on effective competition4. Examples are transfers, 
leases, or mutualisation of spectrum rights 
among firms providing the same service.The incorporation of technology change 
in licenses, the so-called frequency re-
farming, enables market agents to efficiently carry out inter-band technology change since interference problems that may arise would be solved as described in the Coase 
theorem. The theorem conditions, well defined property rights and low transaction costs are usually met in spectrum re-farming type of 
transactions. However, market agent behavior 
might not always be efficient. If the adoption of a new technology results in increased 
competition, market agents might not have the incentive to embrace it in order to keep the privileges of reduced competition. In such 
cases, a regulatory action would be required. Lack of incentives to adopt new technology 
may explain why in most countries radio FM services are still being provided using analogue 
technologies while much more efficient digital technologies are available5. Reforms intended to change the allocation of spectrum and mixed reforms where an allocation change is included are usually 
expected to produce the highest benefit if 
carried out in the right moment. However, such reforms have not only uncertain 
returns, especially uncertain external benefit 
fulfillment, but also uncertain costs. Lack of information about the cost of reforms is an important reason for the market to refrain to carry out transactions. Regulatory mechanisms such as the design of incentive 
auctions or the definition of licenses in terms of maximum acceptable interference might 
help market agents to increase efficiency of changes of spectrum allocation. The following 
sections analyze uncertainty of spectrum management reform both in the return and the cost of reform.
3.1 Uncertain return of a spectrum 
management reformThe return of a spectrum management reform is uncertain because of the existence 
of externalities, services that are pure public goods and economies of scale when the use 
of spectrum is harmonized. The following 
sections analyze each of the causes of uncertainty.
3.1.1 Externalities
The analysis of the social efficiency of a spectrum reform should include the 
reform effects on economic growth, equal opportunities for marginal groups in society and the promotion of effective competition; 
see Cave (2002), ITU (2009).
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Positive externalities appear as a result of the increased number of possibilities for 
producing goods and services, easier access 
to information, reduced transaction costs and new chances for consuming new products and services. If these externalities are not included in spectrum management decisions some services would be provided at a below-the-
optimum amount. For example broadband, a service that can be provided using the 
spectrum, has been associated to GDP growth 
and productivity increase, Gillet et al (2006), 
Litan and Rivlin (2001), Goss (2001), López 
Sánchez et al (2004, 2006).
Production below the optimum may happen for a variety of reasons. One is the economies of density associated to network deployment. Rural areas coverage may be 
socially desirable but privately unprofitable. 
Urban-rural cross subsidy or public funding 
are socially efficient in these cases to achieve 
the optimal social production. Another one is sunk costs6, subsidies and/or public private partnerships may help mitigate the problem.The expected value of a reform may be biased by miscalculating the external value. The social value of spectrum includes what spectrum users are willing to pay plus the externalities associated with the services using the spectrum. Whereas making an educated 
guess about the private value may be possible, the value of the spillover effects is much more 
uncertain and difficult to assess. 
Private value may be calculated with some precision by carefully studying the result of 
previous auctions, applying the cash flow method7, measuring the difference in the total cost of ownership of deploying a network 
without a spectrum band, Frias et al (2016), or even using production functions see R. 
Prasad (2014). Sometimes, the calculation of the external value may not be necessary if the loss of spectrum resulting from a reform 
can be compensated by non-spectrum inputs, 
e.g. a higher number of radio stations, see J.M. 
Garcia and A. Valiño (2013), M. Cave (2016). In 
this case, the calculation of externalities may be substituted by the calculation of the cost of providing the service by other means. In other 
cases, such substitution is either technically 
unfeasible or financially impossible since the 
cost of alternative inputs is unbearable. Then, there is no alternative to calculating the cost of externality loss in order to assess the expected return of the reform.
3.1.2 Pure public goodsSome spectrum services provide goods non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Examples 
are national security and defense, emergency 
assistance, scientific research, whether forecasting or climate change monitoring. These services are not delivered by the market 
and are usually financed with public budget for 
everyone’s benefit. How much spectrum has to be allocated to those services is uncertain since 
the calculation of the benefits they produce is complex.Spectrum management reform based on the increased use of spectrum sharing 
has been proposed in the US and Europe as 
a means to increase efficiency, especially in bands currently used to provide pure public 
goods. However, there must be mechanisms to maintain the optimal production of these public goods ensuring both an optimal amount of spectrum and a service provision free from harmful interference. 
For example, a US Government Report, 
PCAST (2012) found that clearing and 
reallocation of Federal spectrum8 -the spectrum used to deliver pure public goods- would be expensive and lengthy and reallocation a not 
sustainable basis for spectrum policy. Instead, it is proposed to use spectrum sharing as a 
means to increase efficiency under a licensed 
regime. In Europe, a Communication from the 
European Commission to the Parliament, EC 
(2012) defined the conditions to promote the shared use of spectrum.
The definition of clear and effective sharing rules may help to formulate better 
defined property rights and reduced 
transaction costs, thus satisfying Coasian 
schemes. However, the expected result of the 
Coase theorem, the achievement of an optimal agreement mutually advantageous between 
spectrum users, may work only for spectrum sharing between commercial uses. In the case 
of social production, even if public goods have 
higher social value, the public service provider will not be able to pay for interference solution 
when it happens. Thus, when the spectrum is shared between services producing pure public goods and commercial goods there must be mechanisms to enforce property rights and avoiding harmful interference.
3.1.3 Economies of scaleThe allocation of the same portion of 
spectrum in a broad geographical area, 
known as spectrum harmonization, produces 
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important economies of scale which reduces the cost of manufacturing transmitting and receiving devices.  Savings stem from the distribution among a larger number of users of the cost of designing the electronics needed for using a frequency band. It also arises from the diminished technical complexity of the device resulting from the reduced amount of frequencies it has to operate with. The latter effect is especially important in services that are supplied using several frequency bands such as mobile telephony.
For some services, there are additional 
benefits of harmonization. For example, the allocation of the same spectrum band to mobile networks in several countries enables to continue using the same mobile terminal in different countries via “roaming”9 agreements. 
In such case, not only devices cost less but also 
service utility is enhanced. Harmonization of a portion of spectrum may lead to the 
harmonization of the adjacent portions. The use of an adjacent spectrum band may exponentially reduce the cost of deployment of a new network because it enables re-using infrastructure of existing sites10 and it creates economies of scale in network deployment.Regulators and market agents involved 
should act concertedly to make harmonization of certain bands possible in order to achieve 
the benefits of the economies of scale. 
Worldwide harmonization is desirable in certain occasions. The calculation of the return of a spectrum management reform is uncertain since it may depend on the agent coordination success.
3.2 Uncertain cost of spectrum management 
reformChanges in the allocation of spectrum may 
create harmful interference, fragmentation and costs associated to the reallocation of existing 
services. A high level of spectrum exploitation is associated with higher adaptation costs of 
existing devices, higher cost for reallocating 
spectrum, and compensations to spectrum users with licenses still in force.
3.2.1 Uncertain interference levelsChanges in allocation of spectrum may create harmful interference to existing services stemming from the different emission 
parameters, density of stations and typical 
power of the new services.
Different emission parametersThe relevant parameters involved in the 
characterization of harmful interference11 are the design of transmitters and receivers12 and the emission parameters and techniques13. 
Main emission parameters are frequency, 
power, location and direction. The emission techniques depend on technology14. These techniques are normally intended to increase coverage or service capacity but may also have an impact on the existence of or shielding to harmful interference. Transmitters are designed to produce a certain limited amount of out of band emission15 without interfering neighboring spectrum users and receivers are able to accept certain amount and still 
performing well. Consequently, the existence of harmful interference depends on how sensitive to harmful interference are the devices of the incumbent services to the emissions of the entrant and vice versa.Compatibility between stations providing a service and frequency adjacent services is achieved through the setup of limits on emission parameters that are set forth in the spectrum license by a Governmental agency. 
Devices and emission techniques are designed 
to on the one hand maximize capacity and on the other hand to avoid harmful interference among radio stations of the same and adjacent services. If there is a change in spectrum 
allocation, the existing emission parameters and /or devices may interfere with or be interfered by new devices using the adjacent band since they were not initially designed to deal with the new sources of interference. The cost to cope with interference is uncertain not only from the point of view of the engineering 
process, complex compatibility studies are 
required, but also from the point of view of the coordination of all involved agents.
A spectrum allocation approach with reduced interference problems is the use of underlay spectrum sharing techniques. 
Under such approach, new devices are able to co-exists with incumbent users in the same 
frequency band under a set of well-defined 
conditions, but this kind of solutions are 
limited to low power applications. Dynamic sharing is an additional approach that may be used when incumbent services are not using the spectrum in a particular geographical area or time slot.
13
A more global solution is the reform of spectrum licenses in order to include the maximum interference that devices should be able to 
tolerate instead of defining their emission 
parameters. Doing so, would enable future changes in the allocation of spectrum that would be much less complex and uncertain.
Density of stations, the cumulative effectThe greater the density of radio-stations in an area the higher it will be the probability of harmful interference due to the accumulation of interfering signals of multiple nearby stations. 
Webb (2009) maintains that when there is a change in spectrum allocation the cumulative interference effect may have a higher impact on the entrants than on the incumbent service. Networks using the initial allocation 
of spectrum are usually deployed in parallel, 
thus, the density of stations is similar and the cumulative interference problems are solved dynamically during network deployment. 
However, when there is a new allocation of 
spectrum, the network of the entrant service is not yet deployed and it is more exposed to the potential cumulative inference of a much denser network in an adjacent band. The cumulative effect increases the interference problems suffered by the entrants.
A well-designed spectrum license should incorporate a set of parameters including not only the maximum acceptable interference from a station but also taking account of the 
cumulative effect. Such parameter definition complicates license design but diminish future transaction costs.
Differences in the typical power of stations
Problems such as coverage holes16 or 
receiver’s blocking17 may appear if there is 
a significant difference between the typical power of stations of the incumbent service and the stations of a new spectrum allocation. 
When the typical power of stations is similar, the location of both the entrant and the 
incumbent services’ stations tend to be similar and such problems are much less important.
A solution to the problem may be to create different frequency bands bearing in mind the typical power of stations providing the service. These frequency bands would be separated by guard bands to mitigate potential interferences among services. Within these 
bands, changes in the allocation of spectrum to services with similar features would be much 
easy to be carried out. A potential optimal 
organization of such frequency groups would be the creation of bands for unidirectional high power networks -broadcasting-; for unidirectional low power- mobile multimedia-; and low power bidirectional networks-mobile broadband.
3.2.2 Fragmentation of spectrum allocationReallocation of spectrum might create gaps and fragmentation of spectrum use. The minimum number of spectrum units used by 
each service is usually different. Consequently, reallocation may result in unused portions of 
spectrum. For example, let’s consider service 
A using multiples of eight units of spectrum to 
provide a service and service B using multiples 
of five. If service A is willing to relinquish eight units in exchange for compensation and 
service B is willing to pay the compensation, three units would be left unused until a new service is willing and it is able to use them. 
If service B would require 10 units, then the result is either the impossibility to make the transaction or the creation of a band of six 
units of unused spectrum, provided that B is 
willing to relinquish 16 units. 7
Furthermore, the provision of services on adjacent frequency bands usually requires the creation of a guard band18 whose size may be one or several units of spectrum in order to avoid harmful interference among services. 
3.2.3 Uncertain costs associated to the existing 
licenses and devices 
A higher level of usage of a frequency band by incumbents is associated with 
higher adaptation costs of existing devices, 
higher cost for reallocating the spectrum, and compensations to spectrum users with licenses still in force when there is a reallocation process.
Compensation costsReforms changing spectrum allocation may pose important compensation costs. In some cases licenses have not expired and current licensees have the right to receive compensation for loss of earnings before a spectrum band is made available to a new service. When licenses have different 
expiration periods it may be more difficult to 
make the frequencies available, Minervini and 
Piacentino (2007). 
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Reallocation costs during the transition periodReforms making available a portion of 
spectrum tor a new service involve financial costs beyond the compensations for loss of earnings. Such reforms require adaptations 
like changing the transmission frequency, or adapting receivers so that they are no longer able to receive the frequencies allocated to the new entrant service. Receiver adaptation 
can be done by placing filters at the input of 
the receiver. Additionally, in some cases it may be necessary to simulcast19 new and old frequencies during a period which imply higher network operation costs for the incumbent during the transition period. 
Adaptation of existing devicesThe sensitivity to the adjacent channel interference is an important parameter of a receiver. The more resilient it is the device the more expensive it becomes the electronics 
used to mitigate interference. Manufacturers 
design devices to work in a certain predefined environment. If a new allocation is made in 
an adjacent band, receiver features may not 
be sufficient to avoid harmful interference produced by the entrant services. There exist 
mitigation techniques such as placing filters at the input of the receiver to solve the problem. 
However, the total cost of the adaptation is uncertain because depends on the features 
of the stock of receivers, which usually is an 
unknown variable. Once again, the definition of licenses in terms of acceptable interference would help to manufacture more resilient 
devices, consequently, lowering transaction costs of changes of spectrum allocation.
4. A model to analyze the path and speed 
of spectrum management reform
We bring the literature of political economy of reform to the topic of spectrum management. We continue developing the analogy between the case of spectrum reform and the reform of economies in transition 
set out by Minervini (2014). We depart 
from the model in Dewatripont and Roland 
(1995) adding the idiosyncrasies of spectrum 
management. First, we include the evolution of 
technology during the first reform process as an endogenous variable then we allow technology 
change to occur after the first reform period giving the reformer the possibility to wait to 
take advantage of the new technology. We have 
changed some of the notations, explained the meaning of some variables from the view of spectrum reform and added new parameters 
but basic assumptions and definitions remain 
equal to those used in Dewatripont and Roland 
(1995).
The most significant difference between the reform of spectrum management and of economies in transition is the pace of technological progress. Whereas in the 
latter technology is ‘sticky’ and it doesn´t change much during the timeframe of reform 
implementation, in spectrum reform it may 
change during the analyzed timeframe having an impact on the strategy of reformers. Technology is a salient factor to determine whether to implement gradual or big bang 
type of reforms, consequently, in our model it is an endogenous explanatory variable acting as a multiplier of the expected outcome.
A spectrum management reform can be 
defined as a set of regulatory changes intended 
to increase productive, allocative or dynamic 
efficiency of spectrum use. In most cases, the order of reform implementation cannot be chosen but reformers can decide when to start and the speed of reform. 
Big bang reform packages are those introducing several reforms quickly and simultaneously. Gradual reform packages are those where it can be decided whether to proceed with the next package or postpone it. One reason to postpone a reform is waiting for the arrival of a new technology.Reforms are regulatory changes intended 
to enable increasing efficiency either productive or allocative or dynamic. Examples 
were described in section 2. Reforms are carried out sequentially if they are complementary. 
Although we simplify the model considering only two sequential reforms we do not loss generality since it can be understood as complementary packages of reforms that can be carried out in two sequential moments.Reform packages can be designed to 
increase any of the types of efficiency. There 
may be two productively efficient reforms in different portions of spectrum or geographical 
locations. For example, the use of auctions in a portion of the spectrum followed by the use of auctions in the rest of portions being used by this service. It can also be mixed 
reforms packages where it is necessary first 
a productively efficient reform and then a 
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subsequent reform improving allocative 
efficiency. An example is the introduction of a new technology that free up spectrum that can 
be used by an entrant. Finally the definition of spectrum licenses in terms of the maximum acceptable interference may be carried out for a spectrum band and hereinafter in other bands.The outcome generated by a reform depends on a set of possible states of nature with Ni  elements. These elements include the uncertain factors described in section 
3.2, interference levels, fragmentation of 
spectrum, costs associated to the existing licenses and devices and also when applicable 
what was described in section 3.1, economies 
of scale, externalities and pure public goods. 
Other aspects such as political constraints, investment behavior are also included in the composition of the states of nature but for 
those, technology is not a multiplier.We consider two complementary reforms 
 1, 2i =  to be executed in a discrete and 
infinite time horizon. We use a normalized discount factorδ or ( )1 where 1 which describe the period of duration of each reform. The outcome of reform i depends on the 
realizations of a partition of a set of states of nature of Ni  elements. The realization of the k  th element of a reform is { } 1 2 , ., iik i i iNs s s s∈ … . 
For example, in reform 1 the realization of the �k  th element is s k1 �  and in reform 2 the realization of the m  th element is s m2 � . The corresponding outcome for both is ( )1 2,  ,  k mo s s t which is the outcome of both reforms   periods after being implemented but ( ) ( )1 2 1 2,  ,  ,  k m k mo s s t o s s=because we consider the outcome to be time invariant. The present value of ( )1 2,  k mo s s
after the first period is denoted by 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2, , / (1 ) .k m k mO s s o s s δ= −  One of the innovations of our model is the introduction of an exogenous technological advancement 
coefficient after the first reform that is denoted by  1 .The outcome of a reform is unknown 
before it is implemented, for this reason we work with ex ante expected results. We denote expected outcomes depending on the strategy 
of reform, it can be big bang or gradual, and 
the moment the value it is analyzed, it can 
be before any has been realized or when 
the first reform has already been carried out. ( ), 1 2 ,,k m k m k mE O s s O≡  is the expected outcome of a big bang reform before any of 
them have been realized. ( )1 2,m k m mE O s s O≡  is the expected outcome of a big bang strategy 
given that the first period has already passed. 
( )1 0k kH s H≡ <  is the outcome of the first reform of a gradual strategy.  m kO H>  because of the required complementarity of reforms. In gradual reforms one can learn about the 
final total payoff from the implementation of 
 kH  and either postpone or even don’t finish 
the complete set of reforms, whereas in a big bang strategy both reforms have already been compromised and reformers cannot back out. 
A realization of the state of nature of the first reform k  is higher than realization k  if 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2  , ,m k m m k mk k E O s s E O s s> → ≥   There is a probability that once we know ( )1 2,m k mE O s s the payoff is lower than expected. We denote this situation as ( )Pr   k k Pr< ≡  whereas the opposite situation is ( )Pr    k k Pr≥ ≡ . 
Another important aspect of the model is the degree of reversibility of reforms. If the outcome of a reform is lower than expected 
it may be reversed. Reversibility doesn´t necessarily mean to completely go back the reform but for example to reduce the planned 
investment. An example would be to limit the deployment of a network of an entrant service 
allocation only to the most profitable regions 
leaving less profitable areas uncovered due to the emergence of interference problems that 
make unprofitable such areas. In a big bang reform  the only possibility is to reverse both 
reforms, we denote the degree of reversibility of a big bang reform 0ξ < .In the case of the gradual approach it is possible to reverse one 
of the reforms and not carry out one of them, 
the reversibility of the first and second reforms 
are defined respectively 1 0ξ <  and 2 0ξ < . We also assume that
1 2 0ξ ξ ξ≤ + ≤        We assume that the technological advance 
coefficient multiplies reform outcome when it is equal or higher than expectations and divide 
the reversibility coefficient when outcomes are lower than expected thus reducing the negative impact of reversibility. The payoff of 
a big bang reform is defined by the following expression: 
( ) 11  m mBB O PrO Prδ δσ δ ξσ= − + +     
(1)
(2)
(3)
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The payoff of a gradual reform is:
      
( ) 1
11   kGR H Prδ δ ξσ
= − + +
      ( )Pr[ 1 ]m mO Oσδ δ δ+ − +
We are interested in analyzing in which situations a gradual type of reform is better than a big bang strategy depending on the 
technological advancement coefficient. There 
is a range of values of the coefficient that fulfill this requirement.
Proposition 1:  The range of values of the 
technological advance coefficient that make gradualist better than big bang strategies are 
defined by the expression:
[ ]
( )[ ]
1 
1 m k
Pr
O H
δ ξ ξ
σ
δ
−
<
− −   
Proof see appendix.
Proposition 1 holds if  1ξ , ( )1δ δ− , 
  Pr  is high or m kO H≅  which means that even for small values of the technological advance 
coefficient a gradual would be better than a big bang reform if the reversibility of both reforms 
is costly, the duration of the second reform 
is very long, the probability of obtaining an outcome lower than expected is considerable or the reforms are not too complementary.
However, when [ ]( )[ ]
1 1
1 m k
Pr
O H
δ ξ ξ
δ
−
≤
− −the inequality can never be true because 
by definition 1σ > . In such situations the following inequality holds.
[ ] ( )[ ]1 1 m kPr O Hδ ξ ξ δ− ≤ − −This means that a big bang reform will always be the best strategy if ξ ≅ 1ξ  or 
( )1 δ δ−   or   Pr  is low or m kO H  .
Let’s consider now that after the first period the reformer can learn not only about 
the final payoff of reform but also about the evolution of technology in a near future time 
0t . The reformer has the option of waiting for the new technology before continuing with the second reform. We assume that waiting is only possible in case of a gradual strategy 
because big bang configurations imply the 
realization of both reforms as initially planned. 
We define 00 1δ< <  as a delay coefficient that 
captures the reduction of benefits produced by 
the delay 0  t  in the implementation reforms. Therefore we have two competing effects. On 
the one hand there is a reduction of benefits 
0δ  produced by the delay of reforms and on 
the other there is a profit increase σ  produced by the new technology that has positive impact reducing cost and increasing the quality and 
capacity of the effects of the reform. Under this 
framework, we define the payoff of a big bang reform with the following expression: 
( )1  m mBB O PrO Prδ δ δ ξ= − + +      The payoff of a gradual reform is
      ( ) 11   kGR H Prδ δ ξ= − + +                 
( )0Pr[ 1 ]m mO Oσδδ δ δ+ − +
Now, we are interested in analyzing the 
values of the delay coefficient that make a gradual reform better than a big bang strategy in cases where waiting a time 0t  would allow 
the use of a more efficient technology.
Proposition 2: If there is a technological advancement available at time 0  t  enabling a 
higher expected outcome, the range of values 
of the delay coefficient that makes using a gradual reform strategy better than a big bang reform is described by:
( )[ ] [ ]1
0
1  m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δ
δσ
− − + − +
>
 
Proof see appendix.
Proposition 2 holds if ( )1, 1ξ δ δ−  , 
  Pr  is high,  m kO H≅  and 1σ   which means 
that even for big values of the delay coefficient a gradual would be better than a big bang reform 
if the reversibility of both reforms is costly, the 
duration of the second reform is very long, the probability of obtaining an outcome lower 
than expected is considerable, the reforms are not too complementary or the technological 
advance coefficient is considerable.
However, when 
( )[ ] [ ]11  1m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δσ
− − + − +
≥                                                          
the inequality in (9) never holds because by 
definition 0 1δ < , therefore waiting could never be optimal and a big bang type of reform will always be better than a gradual strategy. When this condition holds we have found that:
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
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( ) 11   Prk mBB H Pr Oδ δ ξ σδ≥ − + +
Proof see appendix.That means that for the expression  ( )[ ] [ ]11  1m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δσ
− − + − +
≥
to be true, the big bang reform must be better than the gradual for a given σ  no matter the value of     because it is superior even if 0 1δ →  and therefore there is no delay incurred waiting for the new technology. 
Furthermore, we know that 0 0δ >  so if
( )[ ] [ ]11  0m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δσ
− − + − +
≤
 
waiting will always be the optimal response. We know that this is possible because [ ]1 0ξ ξ− < . 
Under such condition we found that: 
( ) 11  kBB H Prδ δ ξ≤ − +      
Proof see appendix.That means that for the expression 
( )[ ] [ ]11  0m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δσ
− − + − +
≤
 
to be true k<  , then thee second reform is never carried out in case of a gradual reform and the outcome of the big bang reform is always lower than that of the gradual.We now come back to our initial analysis of the range of values of the technological 
advance coefficient that make gradualist better than big bang strategies under the new framework where it is possible to wait for a new technology
Proposition 3: If there is a technological advancement enabling higher expected 
outcome after the first reform period, the range of values of the technological advance 
coefficient that make gradualist better than big 
bang strategies is defined by the expression:
( )[ ] [ ]1
0
1  m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
σ
δδ σ
− − + − +
>
 
Proof see appendix.
Proposition 3 holds if ( )1, 1ξ δ δ−  , 
  Pr  is high,  m kO H≅  and 1σ   which means that a gradual would be better than a big bang reform the if the technological advance 
0δ
coefficient is high, the reversibility of both 
reforms is costly, the duration of the second 
reform is long, the probability of obtaining an 
outcome lower than expected is considerable, the reforms are not too complementary 
or the waiting time is short or a sufficient combination of these effects.
However, when
( )[ ] [ ]11  1m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δσ
− − + − +
≤
 
the inequality in (12) never holds because by 
definition 1σ > , therefore waiting could never be optimal and a big bang type of reform will always be better than a gradual strategy. When this condition holds we have found that:
( ) 1 01   Prk mBB H Pr Oδ δ ξ δ δ≤ − + +    
Proof see appendix.That means that for the expression
( )[ ] [ ]11  1m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δσ
− − + − +
≤
 
to be true, the gradual reform must be better than the big bang reform for a given 0δ  no matter the value of σ  because it is superior even if 1σ →  and the new technology is not improving the expected outcome at all.
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
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5. Conclusions 
Spectrum management reform can be 
analyzed from the perspective of the political economy of reform adding the idiosyncrasies of high technology industries. One distinctive 
feature is the intense technological evolution, thus one cannot assume that technology is 
constant during the reform period.  Another feature is the impossibility of completely reverse reforms. Reversibility here does not mean to return to the status quo but to leave 
unfinished or incomplete some components 
of the reform. For example, if the outcome of the deployment of a network is lower than 
expected, the network may only be built 
in profitable high densely populated areas 
leaving rural locations uncovered, or in other 
cases, the reform could only be carried out 
where uncertainty is the lowest. An additional characteristic is that the reformers cannot choose the order of reforms because they are not only complementary but have the requirement of being implemented in a 
particular order. For example, the adoption of 
a new technology, followed by a new spectrum allocation and a subsequent reallocation of the newly freed up spectrum need to be done in this particular order. The reformer instead must choose the right moment to start the 
reform and the implementation strategy, either big bang or gradual. We offer an expression to determine when to choose a gradual or big bang reform depending on current and expected technology and an expression to determine whether to wait or not for a new technological advancement. Gradual is better if the technological advance 
coefficient is high, the reversibility of both 
reforms is costly, the duration of the second 
reform is long, the probability of obtaining an outcome lower than expected is considerable or the reforms are not too complementaryWe have also shed some light on the types of 
spectrum management reform by categorizing 
them in terms of the type of efficiency gain that 
the reform is intended to produce,- productive, 
allocative and dynamic-. Furthermore, we 
have analyzed market failures responsible for uncertain outcomes to help tackling the underlying causes of failure. The use of market mechanisms to 
improve productive efficiency, -intra-band 
technological change, auctions and secondary 
market transactions-, has already been fruitful 
on the portions of spectrum traditionally been 
used for commercial purposes. In such cases, market forces may result in productively 
efficient transactions provided that Coasian 
schemes are fulfilled; low transaction costs 
and well-defined property rights. Transactions enabling allocative and 
dynamic efficiency are not yet possible to be produced solely by the market. New approaches such as the design of incentive auctions give a broader role to market participants but the active contribution of the regulatory authority to design the direct and reverse auction and the repackaging process is still necessary. 
A different instrument, the authorization of new technologies enabling to share spectrum 
previously used by an incumbent service, is 
improving allocative efficiency making market agents more involved in spectrum allocation. 
However, sharing techniques are usually 
limited either to short range devices, the case 
of underlay spectrum techniques, or by the availability of unused spectrum in certain areas 
or time slots, the case of dynamic spectrum sharing. Spectrum sharing techniques that are 
useful to improve the efficiency of spectrum allocation cannot be used as means to enable the change of use of a band solely by market forces.
An additional innovative approach to 
spectrum management is the definition of spectrum licenses in terms of the maximum acceptable interference that devices should be able to accept. This technique may pose a 
significant advancement to achieve the goal of enabling market transactions changing 
the allocation of spectrum. However, better knowledge of interference problems and more importantly the design of new types of 
licenses, would be required to move forward.
The efficiency of changes of spectrum allocation by market forces may be hampered by the existence of externalities associated to services and services that are pure public 
goods. In addition, market agents may not be 
willing to change to a more socially efficient spectrum allocation due to several reasons including the existence of uncertain costs but also because current market structure may 
grant market power to incumbent users, a situation that they are interested to preserve. 
Regulators must analyze the possibility to enable the re-allocation of spectrum by market forces on a case by case basis.
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Annex 1: Proof of propositions
Proof of proposition 1
According to (3) and (4), for a gradual to be superior to a big bang reform, the following must be 
fulfilled
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
[ ] ( )[ ]
1
1
1
1 11   Pr[ 1 ]  1  
1 11   1  
1  1
k m m m m
k m
m k
H Pr O O O PrO Pr
H Pr O Pr
Pr O H
δ δ ξ σδ δ δ δ δ δ ξ
σ σ
δ δ ξ δ δ ξ
σ σ
δ ξ ξ δ
σ
− + + − + > − + +
− + > − +
− > − −
Therefore  [ ]( )[ ]1 1 m kPr O Hδ ξ ξσ δ −< − −
We know that  
m kO H>  and 1 0ξ ξ≤ ≤  and 1δ <  therefore all the terms of the expression are positive
But 1σ >  therefore if [ ]( )[ ]1 1 1 m kPr O Hδ ξ ξδ − ≤− − this condition will never hold and 
[ ] ( )[ ]1 1 m kPr O Hδ ξ ξ δ− ≤ − −
  
Proof of proposition 2
According to (7) and (8), for a gradual to be superior to a big bang reform, the following must be 
fulfilled
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 0
0 1
1
0
1   Pr 1 1  
1 [ ]  [ ]
1 [ ]  [ ]
k m m m m
m m k m
m k m
m
H Pr O O O PrO Pr
PrO O H Pr PrO
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ σδδ δ δ δ δ δ ξ
σδδ δ δ ξ ξ δ
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δ
σδ
− + + − + > − + +  
> − − + − +
− − + − +
>
By definition  00 1δ< <If ( ) 11 [ ]  [ ] 0m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
σδ
− − + − +
≤ then 0  δ is higher than ( ) 11 [ ]  [ ]m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
σδ
− − + − + and waiting will always be optimal. We know that this may happen because [ ]1 0Prδ ξ ξ− <  in this case
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( )[ ] [ ]
( ) ( )
( )
1
1
1
1   0
1    1 0
1   
m k m
m m k
k
O H Pr PrO
O PrO Pr Pr H
BB H Pr
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δ δ δ ξ δ ξ δ
δ δ ξ
− − + − + ≤
− + + − − − ≤
≤ − +
If ( ) 11 [ ]  [ ] 1m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
σδ
− − + − +
≥ then 0  δ is lower than
 ( ) 11 [ ]  [ ]m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
σδ
− − + − + and waiting will never be optimal. In this case
 ( ) 11 [ ]  [ ]m k m mO H Pr PrO PrOδ δ ξ ξ δ σδ− − + − + ≥
( ) ( ) 11  1  m m k mO Pr PrO H Pr PrOδ δ ξ δ δ δ ξ σδ− + + − − − ≥
( ) 11    k mBB H Pr PrOδ δ ξ σδ− ++≥
Proof of proposition 3
According to (7) and (8), for a gradual to be superior to a big bang reform, the following must be 
fulfilled
( ) ( ) ( )1 01   Pr 1 1  k m m m mH Pr O O O PrO Prδ δ ξ σδδ δ δ δ δ δ ξ− + + − + > − + +  
( )0 11 [ ]  [ ]m m k mPrO O H Pr PrOσδδ δ δ ξ ξ δ> − − + − +
( ) 1
0
1 [ ]  [ ]m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
σ
δδ
− − + − +
>
By definition  1σ >
If ( ) 1
0
1 [ ]   [ ]
1m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δδ
− − + − +
≤  then  σ  is higher than
 ( ) 1
0
1 [ ]   [ ]
 m k m
m
O H Pr PrO
PrO
δ δ ξ ξ δ
δδ
− − + − +  and the inequality never holds . In this case
( ) 1 01 [ ]  [ ]m k m mO H Pr PrO PrOδ δ ξ ξ δ δδ− − + − + ≤
( ) ( ) 1 01   1  m m k mO Pr PrO H Pr PrOδ δ ξ δ δ δ ξ δδ− + + − − − ≤
( ) 1 01  k mBB H Pr PrOδ δ ξ δδ≤ − + +
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Notes
AIP have been implemented in the UK and Canada. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/consulta-
tions-and-statements/category-1/aip/update201008
2 More information about the process of an incentive auction can be found at: https://www.fcc.
gov/wireless/auction-1000
3 Normally there will be a different limit for each type of device, for example, one for transmitters and a different one for receivers.
4 In some cases the establishment of ex-ante regulation such as the definition of spectrum caps might be required to achieve effective competition. Spectrum caps are limits to the maximum 
amount of spectrum that a firm is allowed to use to provide a service. In other occasions ex-post measures might be enough.
5 A complementary explanation is that digital radio receivers are still expensive, and the use of analogue devices is highly extended.
6 Examples of infrastructure involved in high sunk costs are the deployment of satellite networks or undersea cables.
7 Profit generated on account of the allocated spectrum.
8 A list of Federal Spectrum uses elaborated by NTIA (National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration) can be found at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/spec-
trum_use_summary_master-07142014.pdf
9 Roaming is the possibility to continue receiving a service when travelling abroad. Roaming can 
be enjoyed either because a frequency band is harmonized or because user´s terminal can operate in the different frequency bands used in each country.
10 This includes reusing infrastructure like telecommunication towers, the electric feeding system, communication devices and also rights of way and site leasing.
26
11 There are three types of interference: geographical, out of band and in the band itself. Licenses would establish the maximum interference from the adjacent channel and the maximum out of 
band interference (Cave and Webb, 2003).
12 The same radio communication device can work as a transmitter and receiver. For example, a mobile terminal is able to transmit and receive.
13 Unwanted energy can also be the result of a combination of emissions, e.g. intermodulation 
products, or inductions upon reception.
14 For example the use of transmission power control techniques intended to increase mobile phones battery life increases the probability of harmful interference to other systems  http://
www.erodocdb.dk/docs/doc98/official/pdf/ECCRep138.pdf
15 Transmission devices send part of the power emitted outside their transmission band. The 
amount of power sent out of band depends on the features of the transmitter´s output filter. Fur-
thermore, due to the existence of intermodulation products, interferences can be produced on fre-
quencies different to those emitted, due to the emission of a mixture of frequencies taking place in the transmitter. There also exists interference caused by the accumulation of out-of-band signals from multiple nearby transmitters.
16 When the transmitter of a new service is located at the coverage edge of the existing services the probability of interference increases. Services with similar typical power tend to share the same 
or nearby sites thus, reducing the possibility of coverage holes.
17 A receiver can be blocked in the presence of a nearby high power signal. Under such condition the receiver is unable to receive any signal.
18 The existence of guard bands may be necessary even to expand the allocation of a service to 
adjacent bands. For example, the expansion of mobile broadband to adjacent frequency bands requires creating a guard band of unused spectrum.
19 For example, freeing up the so called digital dividend frequencies required to simulcast new and old television channels during a period of time to let people adapt building reception facilities.
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